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With the legalization of cannabis for recre-ational use in 2017 (State of California 2016a), the Government of California embarked on 
an unprecedented, multi-agency initiative to regulate 
the production of an agricultural crop worth up to $20 
billion per annum (Arcview Market Research 2014), the 
largest cash crop in California (Carah et al. 2015). The 
state initially projected $1 billion in tax revenue from 
cannabis sales following legalization for recreational 
use (McGreevy 2018). Building off recent regulations 
for medical cannabis production (State of California 
2016b), the state created a new licensing system for 
growers producing cannabis for recreational use, which 
like medical cannabis, would be distributed legally to 
the public through state-licensed dispensaries. 
The CalCannabis Division of the California 
Department of Food and Agriculture (CDFA) issues 
cannabis cultivation licenses. To cultivate for legal 
markets for recreational (or medical) use, cannabis 
RESEARCH ARTICLE
Growers say cannabis legalization excludes 
small growers, supports illicit markets, 
undermines local economies 
The survey sample was small, but results suggest regulations may need to be modified to 
incentivize grower participation in state licensing programs.
by Hekia Bodwitch, Jennifer Carah, Kent M. Daane, Christy Getz, Theodore E. Grantham, Gordon M. Hickey and Houston Wilson
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Abstract
In 2018, we surveyed cannabis growers about their experiences with 
California’s commercial cultivation legalization system. Our results 
suggest high rates of noncompliance with the new regulations. Of the 
respondents, 31% reported income from cannabis and had not applied 
for cultivation licenses, indicating a violation of state regulations. These 
findings highlight the need to further explore conditions that might 
incentivize growers to apply for cultivation licenses. Respondents’ 
answers and comments indicate modifications to cannabis cultivation 
licensing programs might be needed to reduce compliance costs 
and regulatory inconsistencies and to overcome threats of legal 
repercussions from enhanced bureaucratic oversight. Growers 
characterized legalization as a process that excludes small growers, 
contributes to an increase in black market sales and undermines the 
economies in rural communities. More research is necessary, including 
on the socioeconomic and environmental contributions that unlicensed 
small cannabis growers make to rural regions.
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The state initially 
projected $1 billion 
in tax revenue from 
cannabis sales.
growers are required to get a CDFA cultivation license 
and comply with State Water Resources Control Board 
(SWRCB), California Department of Fish and Wildlife 
(CDFW) and Department of Pesticide Regulation 
(DPR) requirements; all county and local regulations, 
including land use ordinances; and any additional 
mitigation stipulations necessary to obtain California 
Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) approval (CDFA 
2019). Depending on farm location and cultivation 
practices, growers may also require road development 
permits, water diversion permits, wastewater discharge 
permits and CDFW lake and streambed alteration 
agreements. 
CDFA has the authority to issue renewable annual 
cultivation licenses; it can also issue nonrenewable 
provisional licenses to growers who demonstrate that 
CEQA compliance is under way (State of California 
2018a). Once growers have obtained a license for cul-
tivation, they must, among other requirements, tag all 
plants with radio-frequency identification tags to track 
the product from its point of origin to commercial 
sale, maintain 24-hour video surveillance of all plants, 
record the names of and time-
stamp all individuals who enter 
the fenced cultivation area and 
report the weight of any dis-
carded plant material (State of 
California 2017). 
Prior to sale, growers are 
required to hire third-party 
testing laboratories to confirm 
that their crop meets qual-
ity assurance guidelines for 
cannabinoid levels, moisture 
content, residual solvents and 
processing chemicals, pesti-
cides, microbial impurities, 
foreign material, terpenoids, 
mycotoxins and heavy met-
als (State of California 2018b). 
Growers must also pay state 
and county cultivation taxes. 
As of 2019, state cultivation 
taxes per dry weight ounce 
were $9.25 for flower, $2.75 for 
stem and $1.29 for fresh plant 
(CDTFA 2019). County cul-
tivation taxes vary, and some 
counties have yet to develop 
cultivation license guidelines. 
Additionally, growers must 
pay licensed distributors to transport their cannabis 
from the farm to testing sites and dispensaries (State of 
California 2019a).  
Counties and municipalities may enhance state 
cultivation requirements or ban cannabis production 
entirely within their jurisdiction (fig. 1). The SWRCB 
or CDFW may also effectively ban cultivation by refus-
ing to issue licenses in locations where they determine 
cultivation may have an adverse environmental impact 
(CDFA 2019). Further, counties and municipalities 
may prohibit cannabis sales or impose business or sales 
taxes in addition to the state’s retail sales tax rate of 
15% (CDTFA 2019). 
The cultivation licensing system was broadly in-
tended to facilitate cannabis growers’ entrance into the 
legal market while protecting public safety, limiting 
environmental impacts and preventing the distribu-
tion of illegally grown cannabis. However, the exten-
sive cultivation and reporting criteria, coupled with 
Siskiyou — Commercial cultivation and sales banned, with 
exemptions in select incorporated regions (3%).
Humboldt — Permitting processes exist for commercial 
cultivation and sales (26%).
Trinity — Permitting processes exist for commercial 
cultivation; sales ordinances are under development (3%).
Mendocino — Commercial cultivation allowed; sales 
ordinances are under development (30%)
Nevada — Commercial cultivation and sales banned, with 
exemptions in select incorporated regions (17%).
Sonoma — Permitting processes exist for commercial 
cultivation and sales, with variations in incorporated 
regions (9%).
Sacramento — Commercial cultivation and sales banned, 
with exemptions in select incorporated regions (3%).
San Mateo — Permitting processes exist for 
commercial cultivation, sales from out-of-county 
delivery only (3%).
Santa Cruz — Permitting processes exist for 
commercial cultivation and sales (3%).
San Luis Obispo — Permitting processes 
exist for commercial cultivation and sales 
by delivery only (3%).
FIG. 1. Commercial cannabis cultivation and sales regulations in the 10 counties where 
growers participating in a survey reported growing cannabis, August 2018. Percentages 
indicate proportion of survey respondents per county (n = 34). Three counties — 
Siskiyou, Sacramento and Nevada — do not allow commercial cultivation aside from 
exemptions in unincorporated regions. Sources: Humboldt County 2019; Mendocino 
County 2018; Nevada County 2018; Sacramento County 2018; San Luis Obispo County 
2018; San Mateo County 2018; Santa Cruz County 2018; Siskiyou County 2018; Sonoma 
County 2018; Trinity County 2018.
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the high costs of obtaining licenses, may be creating 
disincentives for growers to comply with the regula-
tions. Noncompliance increases the risk of failure in 
the state’s policy to transition growers to legal markets. 
As of April 2018, the state had approved 3,490 tempo-
rary licenses for cultivation. (The state’s ability to issue 
temporary licenses ended Jan. 1, 2019, after which date 
the state was authorized to issue provisional or an-
nual licenses.) The president of the California Growers’ 
Association estimated the number of the state’s canna-
bis growers to be around 50,000 (Staggs 2018). 
Compared to other forms of legal crop cultivation, 
little is known about cannabis production dynamics in 
California. The dearth of research is attributed to chal-
lenges in obtaining federal funding to study federally 
illicit activities and the disincentives for clandestine 
growers to share information with outside parties 
(Short Giannotti et al. 2017). Accounts that do exist 
characterize the industry as emerging in the 1960s 
with the back-to-the-land movement giving rise to a 
proliferation of small farms in California’s North Coast 
region (Potter et al. 2011; Raphael 1985). 
To avoid detection, cultivation took place in remote 
regions, including forested hillsides in Humboldt, 
Mendocino and Trinity counties known as the Emerald 
Triangle (Corva 2014). In 1983, California collaborated 
with the federal Campaign Against Marijuana Program 
(CAMP), deploying helicopters to eradicate plants on 
private property (Corva 2014). Enforcement efforts 
increased the crop’s value in illicit markets, thereby in-
centivizing continued cultivation (Corva 2014; Polson 
2019). 
In 1996, the Compassionate Use Act decriminal-
ized the use and cultivation of cannabis for medical 
purposes in California; it allowed counties to authorize 
production of up to 99 plants per medical card (State 
of California 1996). Accounts of medical cannabis 
cultivation describe small family farms, in contrast to 
the consolidated, intensively farmed industrial agri-
cultural operations throughout California (Guthman 
2004; Polson 2018; Raphael 2012; Walker 2004). In 2012 
and 2013, Google Earth satellite images of Humboldt 
County landscapes suggested an average of 67 plants on 
outdoor grow sites (n = 2,407, standard deviation 75) 
and 86 smaller plants in greenhouses (n = 2,021, stan-
dard deviation 89) (Butsic and Brenner 2016). 
A comparison of Google Earth images between 
2012 and 2016 in Humboldt and Mendocino counties, 
however, documented an 80% increase in the number 
of cultivation sites and a 56% increase in the aver-
age number of total plants per site (Butsic et al. 2018). 
Although still small in scale compared to traditional 
agriculture, cannabis production was expanding, and it 
was expanding in part in ecologically sensitive remote 
watersheds, where histories of cultivation corresponded 
to concerns about ecological stress from water diver-
sion and fragmented forested landscapes (Butsic and 
Brenner 2016; Butsic et al. 2018; Carah et al. 2015; 
Wang et al. 2017).
The increase in cultivation sites and produc-
tion densities may be due to relaxed enforcement 
and subsequent increased market competition. In 
2012, California abandoned CAMP and replaced it 
with a new program, the Cannabis Eradication and 
Reclamation Team (CERT), which effectively reduced 
enforcement and redirected it to public lands (Corva 
2014; Polson 2019). In 2017, the Drug Enforcement 
Administration estimated that 70% of the nation’s can-
nabis supply came from California (DEA 2017). 
How legal cannabis production will develop re-
mains unclear, but it will be strongly influenced by 
if and how existing growers participate in the state’s 
cannabis regulatory system. The recreational can-
nabis market could create a demand for ecologically 
beneficial production (Bennett 2018). Access to legal 
markets might also create opportunities for growers to 
brand their products as socially or ecologically sustain-
able, or to emulate other forms of legal agriculture and 
organize collectively to overcome market competition 
(Cook 1995; Short Giannotti et al. 2017). Conversely, 
if regulations limit access to the legal market, grow-
ers may either cease production or cultivate for illicit 
markets.
To characterize the ecological and socioeconomic 
effects of cannabis policy changes and better under-
stand cultivation practices, we conducted an anony-
mous survey of California cannabis growers from July 
1 to Aug. 15, 2018. The objective was to document rela-
tionships between aspects of production and growers’ 
experiences with the legalization system and the regu-
latory environment. Results on cultivation practices are 
covered in Wilson et al. 2019 (p. 119, this issue). Here, 
we report respondents’ experiences with legalization. 
Online anonymous survey
Given the legal risks cannabis growers might assume 
when reporting their practices, we deployed an online, 
anonymous survey to try to access a wide range of 
growers. We distributed the survey through the list-
servs of several prominent California cannabis grower 
organizations in July 2018. We administered the survey 
using the Qualtrics survey platform (Qualtrics, Provo, 
Utah), which encrypted participants’ IP addresses so 
that responses were collected anonymously. 
We estimated that 17,500 email addresses received 
the survey, not all of which necessarily represented 
cannabis growers or were active emails. Because we 
were unable to view the listservs or contact growers 
directly, and given the uncertainties surrounding es-
timates of the state’s number of cannabis growers, we 
were unable to estimate a response rate. We were also 
unable to follow up with growers directly to increase 
participation. For a full discussion of the survey meth-
ods, see Wilson et al. 2019.
In the survey, we asked questions relating to compli-
ance, including “Have you applied for a state or county 
license to grow cannabis?” We also asked growers to 
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report their income received from cannabis cultiva-
tion. We determined growers who had not applied for 
a license but who reported income received from can-
nabis to be out of compliance with state and county 
regulations. 
Additionally, we asked growers three open-ended 
questions: respondents who indicated they had not ap-
plied for a license had an opportunity to explain why; 
growers were invited to comment on the state licensing 
system and how it could be improved; and they could 
share any additional information about their farms. 
We manually coded qualitative responses for thematic 
trends. We characterized farm size based on California 
state licensing criteria (State of California 2017): small 
farms were 10,000 square feet or less, medium farms 
were 10,001 to 22,000 square feet and large farms were 
those over 22,000 square feet. (1 acre = 43,560 square 
feet, 1 hectare = 107,639 square feet.)
We received 101 responses, with variations in re-
sponse rates among questions. Within this group, 36 
growers provided feedback about their participation 
in state and county licensing initiatives, and 35 on the 
income they received from cannabis cultivation. We 
received feedback about the ways in which the legaliza-
tion system could be improved from 30 participants. 
Although this is a small number of cannabis growers 
compared to estimates of the grower population, pre-
liminary conclusions regarding grower perceptions can 
be drawn from this sample for the purpose of guiding 
future research on California’s cannabis policy.
Demographics
Growers who answered the survey questions about 
compliance reported farming in 10 California counties: 
Siskiyou (3%), Humboldt (26%), Trinity (3%), Men-
docino (30%), Nevada (17%), Sonoma (9%), Sacramento 
(3%), San Mateo (3%), Santa Cruz (3%) and San Luis 
Obispo (3%) (n = 34). Commercial cultivation and sales 
regulations varied between and within these coun-
ties (fig. 1). The growers who both answered questions 
about compliance and also provided feedback about 
the legalization system farmed cannabis for an average 
of 20 years (range: 3 to 50 years) (n = 30). Their ages 
ranged from 34 to 70, with an average age of 53 (n = 
29); 69% identified as male, 28% as female and 3% as 
other (n = 32).
Compliance, cannabis income
Of the 36 growers who provided feedback on their par-
ticipation in state or county licensing initiatives, over 
half (53%) reported that they had not participated in 
them (Wilson et al. 2019). Of the 35 growers who re-
ported both on participation in licensing initiatives and 
income sources, 31% reported income from cannabis 
and had not applied for cultivation licenses, indicating 
their noncompliance with state and county regulations. 
Among the growers who had not applied for cultiva-
tion licenses and who also reported on income sources 
(n = 18), 39% indicated that they obtained no income 
from cannabis, 11% received less than a quarter of 
their income from cannabis, 11% received between a 
quarter and half, 22% received between half and three-
quarters and 17% received more than three-quarters of 
their income from cannabis (fig. 2). Among those who 
had applied for state or county licenses and reported 
income sources (n = 17), 17% reported receiving no 
income from cannabis, 6% received a quarter or less, 
6% received between a quarter and half, 12% received 
between half and three-quarters and 59% received all 
of their income from cannabis cultivation. 
Nonlicensed growers who supported their liveli-
hoods from cannabis cultivation and explained their 
noncompliance (n = 10) said they were unable to 
apply because of county cultivation bans or unfor-
mulated guidelines (70%) and cost constraints (40%). 
Additionally, 20% indicated they planned to apply. A 
small grower from Siskiyou County explained, “I live 
in a ban county. I plan to apply in a nearby city once 
the city puts a cultivation ordinance on the books.” A 
small grower from Mendocino County specified that 
the plant “track and trace” provisions of the licensing 
system were cost prohibitive. 
Disincentives to seek licenses
Compliant and nonlicensed growers also commented 
on the state’s licensing system and how it could be 
improved (n = 30). All respondents except one (who 
Percentage of income 
from cannabis
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FIG. 2. Over half of survey respondents indicated that they had not yet applied for the 
necessary licenses to cultivate cannabis but received income from cannabis cultivation. 
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argued that the regulation favored larger corporations, 
without specifying how) identified specific limitations 
of the system related to at least one of three themes: 
costs, regulatory inconsistencies or alterations needed 
to production practices.
Costs
Of the growers who commented, 70% identified costs 
as inhibiting compliance with state legalization initia-
tives. A medium-sized grower from Mendocino County 
described the multi-agency licensing system as “Too 
many departments asking for too many fees.” A small, 
nonlicensed grower from Nevada County attributed 
increased costs to regulations around sales and trans-
port: “I would be willing to pay my fair share of taxes 
on products sold if I could continue to be responsible 
to test and transport my own product, deal directly 
with dispensaries as I did for years.” Similarly, a small 
grower from Mendocino County, who had applied for a 
license, described lost profits from distributors control-
ling the pricing structure: “The distributor is control-
ling prices and gouging farmers because regulations 
prevent small farmers from taking their products to 
other licensees.” 
Regulation inconsistencies
Respondents (37%) identified possible inconsistency 
between county, regional and state production regu-
lations as constraining their engagement with the 
legalization initiative. A large grower from Humboldt 
County said, “Often, one agency will approve a project, 
and the other agency involved doesn’t. Then, you are in 
violation with the approving agency if you don’t do the 
work, and in violation with the other agency if you do 
the work.”
Standard practices illegal 
Respondents (40%) identified difficulties in altering 
their production practices to comply with the new 
regulatory system. A small grower from Mendocino 
County indicated that new regulations made previous 
standard practices illegal: “My situation is totally stan-
dard: well fenced-in area, no environmental impact. I 
grow tomatoes, etc., in hoop houses, and now, because 
I applied for a license, I suddenly must get a permit for 
hoop houses that have been here for 15 years.”
Effects on production 
A group of growers (n = 32) also commented on the ef-
fects of state cannabis legalization on production. Their 
remarks focused on three themes: exclusion of small 
growers, an increase in unregulated market exchanges 
and alterations to local economies. 
Exclusion of small growers
Respondents (50%) explicitly stated that legalization 
privileged larger, wealthier operations or put small 
organizations out of business (n = 32). A small grower 
from Humboldt County explained, “There was a pre-
tense at both county and state levels of recognition 
that the transition to ‘legal’ pot (more correctly the 
transition from felony to 
misdemeanor pot regula-
tion) should allow time for 
small producers to adapt, 
because the economic ef-
fect of wiping them out 
would devastate com-
munities across the state. 
No such policy came into effect.” Another experienced 
small grower in Humboldt County said, “Small farmers 
are being left out and corporations are taking over.”
An active unregulated market 
Growers (19%) indicated that legalization corresponded 
to a rise in unregulated market exchanges (n = 32). A 
small grower from Siskiyou County argued that local 
bans “let the black market growers operate with im-
punity where I live…. I want a license. I have vended 
to the same dispensaries for 10 years. My cannabis 
has always been tested. I grow organically and con-
scientiously.” A medium grower from Trinity County 
argued that the “thriving private [illicit] market has no 
incentive or ability to cross over.” A small grower from 
Humboldt County reflected, “Only the large black mar-
ket farms are surviving. All small cottage farms have 
closed up.” A medium grower from Trinity County in-
dicated that workers also avoid the legal market: “There 
is a labor shortage for on-the-books workers. The pri-
vate [illicit] market is able to pay the same rate or more 
but taxes are taken out so workers look for unregulated 
farms to work at first.”
Altered community economies
Respondents (25%) indicated that the legalization ini-
tiative was altering community economies (n = 32). A 
small grower from Nevada County argued, “Counties, 
by creating prohibitive (or no) ordinances that allow 
commercial cultivation, are disregarding the extent to 
which longstanding small cannabis businesses support 
their communities. We are already seeing the impact 
on local business — empty restaurants and storefronts 
in our once bustling town.” A medium grower from 
Mendocino County, who had applied for the necessary 
state licenses, explained, “All cannabis farmers aren’t 
rich outlaws. We are these communities.”
Concern for the environment 
Growers (33%) identified the environment as a concern 
or made note of their own practices relative to the en-
vironment (n = 32). A small grower from Humboldt 
County explained, “We love our home and have always 
practiced our business with the environment foremost 
in our mind. We are being blamed for the degradation 
of our home when it was logged several times and there 
were no fish when we got here. We have all worked 
Respondents (50%) explicitly stated 
that legalization privileged larger, 
wealthier operations or put small 
organizations out of business.
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to heal this land and weed is the reason we had the 
time and resources.” The concern for the environment 
reported in our survey suggests a willingness among 
growers to produce their crops in ecologically benefi-
cial ways, regardless of their compliance status. 
Potential regulatory improvements
Several survey participants suggested strategies for im-
proving the regulatory system. A medium grower from 
Humboldt County, who had applied for two cultiva-
tion licenses, argued, “An opportunity to mitigate or a 
timeline to amortize costs will help small farmers who 
cannot afford the intense costs associated with regula-
tions.” A small grower from Sonoma County, who was 
not licensed, suggested, “Keeping grows limited in 
acreage so that smaller growers can compete is crucial 
in my mind and will lead to a more diversified agricul-
tural system.” 
Legal and black market access 
Growers’ responses suggest high rates of noncompli-
ance and characterize legalization as a system that 
legitimizes the cultivation activities of an exclusive set 
of growers: large growers with the financial resources 
to locate their farm in a legal jurisdiction, pay licensing 
fees, alter their practices and increase production to 
comply with new laws and remain competitive in legal 
markets. It is likely that rates of noncompliance within 
the broader cannabis grower population are even 
higher than reported in our data, as our survey reached 
only growers registered on industry listservs; and, even 
though it was anonymous, it covered illegal livelihood 
activities, creating potential disincentives to accurately 
declare practices. 
Respondents’ accounts of small growers’ exclusion 
from newly regulated cannabis market opportunities 
— due to the misalignment of the regulations with 
existing practices and the costs of compliance — echo 
the literature on governmental and nongovernmental 
regulation and certification of production practices 
in other sectors, in which codification of regulations 
or standards has led to formal and informal exclusion 
of some growers from commodity markets (Bodwitch 
2017; Côte and Korf 2018; Dwyer 2015; Getz and 
Shreck 2006; Lund 2011; Milgroom 2015; Putzel et al. 
2015). 
In the United States, for example, structural exclu-
sion has been documented in the voluntary, third-
party certification of organic agriculture, because its 
particular standards and onerous costs have facilitated 
the dominance of agribusiness at the expense of small 
growers (Buck et al. 1997). Similar exclusionary ten-
dencies are also a defining effect of the rise of the food 
safety regulatory regime, comprised of both state regu-
lations and market-driven audit requirements (Baur et 
al. 2017). Our research indicates similar patterns with 
the legalization of cannabis: the burden of compliance 
not only favors larger producers over smaller ones but 
also shifts the profit-making opportunities from pro-
ducers to nonproducers (Foley and McCay 2014; West 
2012).
The illicit market continues in California, and the 
two markets, legal and illicit, likely influence one an-
other. Disincentives for small growers to participate 
in legal markets can also be attributed to, along with 
the factors already discussed, the demand for cannabis 
in the illicit market channels, both in and out of state 
(Caulkins et al. 2015; Klieman 2016; Short Gianotti 
et al. 2017). As of June 2019, 39 states had yet to legal-
ize cannabis for recreational sales (Berke and Goulde 
2019). In California, state and county taxes increase 
the legal cannabis price, and that higher price may also 
contribute to in-state illicit market demand. To meet 
industry analysts’ estimates of $1 billion in tax revenue 
(McGreevy 2018), at least $7 billion of cannabis needs 
to be sold through legal markets (Kreiger 2019). In 
2018, $2.5 billion was sold, and the state received $345 
million in cannabis tax revenues (Kreiger 2019).
Research needs, policy 
considerations
Accounts from noncompliant growers of the effects of 
legalization indicate a need to explore strategies that 
will incentivize growers’ participation in legal markets. 
In 2018, $2.5 billion of 
cannabis was sold through 
legal markets, and the state 
received $345 million in tax 
revenues.
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Their accounts also raise questions for more research 
on the socioeconomic and environmental effects of the 
state’s licensing system.  
California’s new cannabis regulations put limits on 
transportation and distribution (State of California 
2017), and consolidate supply chains through a limited 
number of registered distributors (State of California 
2019b). Further analysis on the effects of supply chain 
consolidation on compliance rates is needed to under-
stand how nonenvironmental aspects of the licensing 
system influence cultivation practices. 
Further research is also warranted on small-pro-
ducer cooperatives, which in other agricultural sec-
tors have improved the collective access of growers to 
information, credit and markets, while also enhancing 
regulatory compliance, community development and 
innovation (Fischer and Qaim 2012; Reed and Hickey 
2016). Grower organizations in the cannabis industry 
include county and statewide policy and lobbying 
groups, as well as private marketing and environmen-
tal advocacy initiatives (Polson 2019). Yet, given the 
historically clandestine nature of production, industry-
led cooperatives in the cannabis sector likely do not 
exhibit the political and economic influence at the state 
level that is exhibited by cooperatives in other sectors 
(e.g., almonds). At this point, producer organizing can 
receive only limited support from UC Cooperative 
Extension (UCCE) personnel because of the restric-
tions on use of federal funds for cannabis research or 
development. 
Little is known about the ways in which noncompli-
ant growers presently organize to access illicit markets. 
It is possible that a reliance on clandestine markets cre-
ates disincentives to collective production and market 
access strategies. Illicit growers may be more likely 
to organize their resources to avoid detection, and, 
without access to crop insurance or crime reporting, to 
protect their operations. Understanding forms of coop-
eration in clandestine markets may help identify social 
as well as economic factors most likely to facilitate 
compliance (Winter and May 2001). 
State legalization of cannabis production presents 
an opportunity for growers to better manage risks and 
enhance returns. To this end, there is a need for further 
research and policy exploration of potential participa-
tion incentive mechanisms, such as tax credits, crop 
insurance, small business development grants, exten-
sion and training. These mechanisms could promote 
environmental objectives, community development 
goals and regulatory compliance. More understanding 
of what incentivizes growers would help UCCE iden-
tify extension efforts most likely to enhance growers’ 
control over the distribution of economic benefits from 
legal cannabis cultivation. Analyses of relationships 
between land use zoning, farm licensing requirements 
and compliance costs would help inform outreach with 
state, county and municipal policymakers to promote 
regulations most likely to elicit compliance and reduce 
enforcement costs.
The high rates of nonlicensed production coupled 
with growers’ accounts of the effects of legalization 
on communities indicate a need for more systematic 
research on the socioeconomic contributions that 
nonlicensed growers are making. Because cannabis has 
historically operated as a cash economy, it is likely that 
the majority of income from cultivation has been spent 
locally; cash from cannabis is difficult to transport and 
invest elsewhere (ERA Economics 2017).
These contributions to local communities were 
largely unaccounted for in the state’s economic analysis 
of the medical cannabis cultivation regulations, on 
which the recreational cultivation licensing program 
was based (ERA Economics 2017). The analysis iden-
tified “significant costs” of regulation for growers, 
including costs related to local and state licensing, 
cultivation plan preparation, water and pesticide use 
approval, farm record maintenance, business license 
applications, track and trace system operation, pro-
cessing, legal labor, consultants and farm inputs (ERA 
Economics 2017). The analysis did not address regional 
effects — for example, the possibility for decreased 
spending in places with histories of cannabis cultiva-
tion as cultivation expands elsewhere and intensifies 
market competition. Interviews with leaders of can-
nabis organizations and distributors, growers, and 
representatives from county employment and benefits 
departments, among others, to document the socio-
economic changes they experience and witness in this 
transition to a regulated cannabis market will help 
build this knowledge base. 
The state’s economic analysis suggested that la-
bor compliance costs would be the most significant 
direct regulatory cost for growers (ERA Economics 
2017). In-depth analyses with growers and workers 
are needed to illuminate the characteristics of the 
cannabis labor force and its trajectory since legaliza-
tion (ERA Economics 2017). To mitigate the negative 
consequences of legalization for growers and rural 
communities, the exclusionary and racialized effects of 
regulation (Polson and Petersen-Rockney 2019, this is-
sue; Polson 2019) also need to be better understood.
Improving social and 
environmental outcomes
Cannabis legalization in California could legally au-
thorize the activities of tens of thousands of growers. 
However, our survey results suggest that the regulation 
structures and costs may be creating disincentives to 
participate in legal markets — in effect, incentiviz-
ing ongoing participation in the illicit market. Given 
the low number of respondents in our survey, more 
research is needed to understand the extent to which 
our results reflect broader trends. An improved under-
standing could inform efforts to ensure legalization 
corresponds to improved outcomes for growers as well 
as the environments and communities in which can-
nabis is grown. c
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